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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for drug violence (mexico)
3 results foundAuthor: Eberle, Miriam Title: The Logic of Drug-Related Violence: A Case Study of Mexico from 2006 to 2011 Summary: Mexico has experienced a dramatic escalation of drug-related violence under Mexican President Calderón which has reached a level of intensity and atrocity transcending previous periods of drug-related violence. How to explain the dramatic rise of drug-related violence since 2006? Why are some states plagued with extremely high levels of drug-related violence, whereas others remain largely unaffected? The thesis seeks to explain the variation of drug related violence across time and space by using Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence. The central propositions and hypotheses of Kalyvas’ theory will be tested by using data on the Mexican case in general and Michoacán in 2009 in particular. The aim is to show whether or not the theory correctly predicts drug-related violence in Mexico. However, there have been some major impediments that complicated the use of Kalyvas theoretical model on the Mexican case: (1) data is often lacking and incomplete; (2) the Mexican “conflict” is a mixture of irregular and conventional warfare; (3) there is more than one conflict, namely one between the Mexican government and the DTOs, and various other conflicts among the different DTOs themselves; and (4) the relationship between DTOs and state officials cannot be compared with the one that exists between incumbents and insurgents in a classical sense. Although only a plausibility probe, the case of Mexico between 2006 and 2011 and of Michoacán in 2009 in particular, provides strong evidence that Kalyvas’ theoretical model can even be applied on this case: (1) civilian support matters for the outcome of the conflict and the actors involved are eager to obtain it; (2) violence plays a key role in obtaining control and collaboration; (3) Mexican DTOs use both types of violence, though selective violence seems to be the predominant type of violence. A shift from indiscriminate violence to more selective violence within the process of the conflict does not seem to conform to the empirical reality. The measurement of territorial control on the case of Michoacán turned out to be difficult; in some cases impossible. Furthermore, there was only little empirical evidence. It was therefore not possible to make rigorous hypotheses testing. Despite these limitations there was evidence that: (1) zone 1 and zone 5 are affected by low levels of violence; (2) zone 2 and 4 are affected by high levels of violence; and (3) Kalyvas’ last hypothesis for zones of parity could neither be confirmed nor denied because of the lack of empirical evidence. However, I assume that the internal logic of DTOs must contradict this hypothesis. Instead I argue that they are equally affected by violence like zone 2 and 4. The following recommendations can be made: (1) the Mexican government has to put more efforts to obtain civilian support which implies combating corruption, regaining trust of the civilian population and winning the “war of perceptions” by preventing DTOs from spreading their propaganda; (2) active or passive collaboration with a DTO does not necessarily mean sympathy, it might also be the result of lacking alternatives and a will to survive; (3) the mere reliance on the Mexican armed forces is counterproductive and has contributed to the escalating levels in violence; as a result (4) Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence should be integrated into the policy process. This bears practical contributions, namely to better interpret the varying patterns of drug-related violence which could help to produce more subtle approaches how to cope with DTOs. Details: The Netherlands: Radboud University Nijmegan, 2011. 129p. Source: Thesis: Internet Resource: Accessed March 23, 2012 at http://geography2.ruhosting.nl/masterthesis/scripties/EberleMiriam.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://geography2.ruhosting.nl/masterthesis/scripties/EberleMiriam.pdf Shelf Number: 124669 Keywords: Corruption (Mexico)Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug Markets (Mexico)Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Violence (Mexico)Police Behavior (Mexico) |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: To Be or Not To Be a Drug Trafficker: Modeling Criminal Occupational Choices Summary: Violent deaths, kidnapping and extortion have spiked in Mexico’s border towns since 2004. Using a formal model and case studies from Mexico, I argue that such phenomena are partially explained by (a) a change in the politics of organized crime, (b) changes in the composition of illegal labor markets, and (c) the incentives generated at legal labor markets. With democratization, Mexico’s government became unable to keep performing its role as central enforcer of territorial boundaries between drug cartels. As cartels became guardians of their own territories, a need to recruitment new cartel members to form private armies emerged. As a result, an illegal labor market –so far closed to non-blood-related individuals– opened and modified the incentives to join/remain in the legal labor markets. The outcome was the emergence of a new generation of drug employees that (a) disdain old mafia laws, (b) are more violent and (c) are also more prone to take part of other forms of “entrepreneurial” illegal occupations such as kidnapping and extortion. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_MPSA2010_TobeOrNotToBe.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_MPSA2010_TobeOrNotToBe.pdf Shelf Number: 125872 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug Violence (Mexico)ExtortionKidnappingsOrganized Crime |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Why Are Mexican Traffickers Killing Each Other? Government Coordination and Violence Deterrence in Mexico's Drug War Summary: Mexico’s Drug War was a drug war between criminal organizations ignited by a state that enforced the law without coordinating with its different levels of government. In this paper, I show why. In doing so, I provide a theory of how political institutions induce competing groups to either peacefully cooperate or go to war. I argue that when formal and informal institutions lead to coordination among different levels of government, such that they act as a single coordinated entity, criminal organizations behave and organize in ways that are less prone to violence, and thus, less damaging to citizens. A time-variant data-set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the sub-national level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions are used to test my argument. I provide empirical evidence that the propensity of criminal organizations to engage in damaging criminal activities increases when municipal and state governments are not coordinated (i.e. are ruled by different political parties). A detailed description of corruption dynamics within Mexico’s drug trafficking industry is also presented to show how lack of government coordination caused a war of 51,000 casualties on the US-Mexico border. Details: Cambridge, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2012_CoordinationCriminality.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2012_CoordinationCriminality.pdf Shelf Number: 127267 Keywords: DeterrenceDrug TraffickingDrug Violence (Mexico)Violent CrimeWar on Drugs |